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Abstract
Privacy is crucial in many applications of machine learning. Legal, ethical and societal
issues restrict the sharing of sensitive data making it difficult to learn from datasets that
are partitioned between many parties. One important instance of such a distributed setting
arises when information about each record in the dataset is held by different data owners
(the design matrix is “vertically-partitioned”).
In this setting few approaches exist for private data sharing for the purposes of sta-
tistical estimation and the classical setup of differential privacy with a “trusted curator”
preparing the data does not apply. We work with the notion of (, δ)-distributed differ-
ential privacy which extends single-party differential privacy to the distributed, vertically-
partitioned case. We propose PriDE, a scalable framework for distributed estimation
where each party communicates perturbed random projections of their locally held fea-
tures ensuring (, δ)-distributed differential privacy is preserved. For `2-penalized super-
vised learning problems PriDE has bounded estimation error compared with the optimal
estimates obtained without privacy constraints in the non-distributed setting. We confirm
this empirically on real world and synthetic datasets.
1. Introduction
Data driven personalization—from user experience on the web to medicine and healthcare—
relies on aggregating a large amount of potentially sensitive data relating to individuals from
disparate sources in order to answer statistical queries. Understandably, from a privacy
perspective it may be undesirable—or even impossible—for such data to be shared in an
undisguised form. For example, in healthcare and medical science applications, highly
∗. Both authors contributed equally to this work.
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Figure 1: Vertically partitioned data: each party holds a subset of the total number of features,
containing the data from the same set of individuals. Each party with access to Y can
estimate βk.
personal information is collected about individuals which can be invaluable for diagnosis,
treatment and drug discovery. The use and sharing of such data is governed by relevant laws
such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) which typically
only allow data to be shared if it has been de-identified (Sarwate et al., 2014). However,
even after a dataset has been sanitized, the risk of subjects being re-identified is an ongoing
concern and in many such cases privacy breaches actually occurred (El Emam et al., 2011).
Differential privacy (DP) (Dwork, 2006) constitutes a powerful theoretical framework
for guaranteeing that the output of a suitable algorithm will not allow the identification of
individuals in a dataset. Recently, it has been considered as a method of complying with the
many regulations for sharing data in e.g. healthcare applications (Dankar and El Emam,
2013). Informally, a differentially private algorithm is one that ensures information identi-
fying an individual cannot be learned from the output of that algorithm on two datasets
which differ only by that individual.1
In case of supervised learning, research has mainly focused on ensuring that a model
estimated in the single party setting can be publicly released (Chaudhuri et al., 2011).
However, in many application areas where sensitive data is held by several parties—e.g.
health informatics, risk modelling and computational social science (D’Orazio et al., 2015)—
estimating a model and performing statistical inference, rather than coefficient release, is
often the stated goal. Therefore, an important open question concerns how sensitive data
can be shared among different parties in a distributed computation framework to optimize
a global statistical learning objective.
Summary of contributions. In §2 we formally introduce the problem setting—statistical
estimation where sensitive data is partitioned vertically between multiple parties—and de-
scribe some of the unique challenges in this setting. In §3 we propose PriDE (Private
Distributed Estimation), a scalable algorithm for differentially private statistical estimation
when the data are partitioned vertically among multiple parties. Our key insight is that
to ensure privacy, we require a small algorithmic change to the recently proposed Dual-
Loco framework (Heinze et al., 2016). In §4, we show the following theoretical properties
of PriDE:
§4.1 Privacy: PriDE preserves (, δ)-distributed differential privacy (cf. Definition 2).
1. Many definitions with subtle differences are used. We will formally state a definition for our purposes in
§4.
2
§4.2 Utility: The estimation error of PriDE with respect to the optimal coefficients
(estimated in the non-distributed setting under no privacy constraints) is bounded.
The second main contribution is an extensive evaluation of the empirical behavior of PriDE
on a variety of simulated and real datasets in §5. We observe that PriDE improves upon
a fully-private baseline which avoids communicating any data between parties and quickly
approaches the performance of the optimal solution. Related work is discussed in §6.
2. Problem setting
In this work, we are interested in objectives of the form
min
b∈Rp
{
J(b) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
fi(b
>xi) +
λ
2
‖b‖22
}
(1)
where λ > 0 is the regularization parameter. The loss functions fi(b
>xi) depend on a
response yi ∈ R and linearly on the coefficients, b ∈ Rp through a vector of covariates,
xi ∈ Rp. Furthermore, we assume all fi to be convex and smooth with Lipschitz contin-
uous gradients. For example when fi(b
>xi) = (yi − b>xi)2, Eq. (1) corresponds to ridge
regression; for logistic regression fi(b
>xi) = log (1 + exp (−yib>xi)). Let β denote the true
underlying coefficients of interest.
In the multi-party setting where the data are vertically partitioned, each party k has
some proportion of the features corresponding to all of the observations (cf. Figure 1).
Given a design matrix X ∈ Rn×p whose rows are x>i , each party holds a disjoint subset of
the p available features, P1, . . . ,PK of size2 τ = p/K belonging to the same observations.
Throughout, we assume that the columns of X are normalized to have mean zero and unit
variance. Let Xk ∈ Rn×τ be the sub-matrix whose columns correspond to the coordinates
in Pk. The set P−k contains all coordinates not in Pk.
Each party aims to estimate βk ∈ Rτ , the portion of the true underlying parameter
vector β corresponding to the features it holds, while accounting for the contribution of
the features held by the remaining parties. However, due to privacy concerns the parties
are not allowed to share their locally-held features. This scenario is of particular interest
in healthcare and biomedicine (Que et al., 2012; Ohno-Machado, 2012; Li et al., 2015; Wu
et al., 2012) but also in customer profiling and personalization.
Example scenarios. Here we briefly outline (non-exhaustively) two special cases of the
general problem setting which cover a wide range of possible use cases—in particular in
medical analyses—where a thorough accounting of confounding factors requires a mixture
of public and private data to be aggregated.
(A) The data held by some parties is sensitive while the data held by other parties is public
and not sensitive (e.g. Burkhardt et al. (2015)). It is possible to publish coefficients of
the public blocks while still accounting for possible confounding effects of the private
blocks.
2. For simplicity of notation only, in general the partitions can be of different sizes.
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Figure 2: Scenario (A). The confounders in C influence both the variables in X as well as the
response Y .
(B) The response is not known to all parties. Then coefficients are only estimated for
the blocks which know the response. The remaining parties just provide their data in
secure form.
A concrete example of (A) is described graphically in Figure 2. Consider the response
Y being a variable measuring a cancer patient’s health. Both genomic factors (contained in
the set C) as well as gene expressions (in set X) have an influence on Y . In turn, genomic
factors affect gene expressions. It is impossible to conduct a randomized study to estimate
the effect of X on Y because gene expressions cannot be randomized. Additionally, due
to its highly personal and sensitive nature, genomic data is rarely publicly available so
C and X are stored separately (i.e. the full design matrix is vertically partitioned as in
Burkhardt et al. (2015)). Due to the confounding links between C and X, only including
gene expressions in the model can result in heavily biased estimates for the effect of X on
Y (Pearl, 2009).
Conducting studies that offer a holistic view on the factors influencing the response—as
opposed to relying on biased estimates resulting from marginal studies—is tremendously
important. However, it is an open question how to estimate the full model while providing
formal privacy guarantees on the data sharing mechanism.
A further challenge comes from the observation that algorithms which preserve differ-
ential privacy typically scale poorly with dimensionality (Chaudhuri et al., 2011). Unfortu-
nately, high-dimensional data is often encountered in biomedical applications where it can
often be used to uniquely identify individuals due to the small sample sizes. This makes the
need for privacy-aware algorithms which scale to high-dimensional problems more pressing.
3. The PriDE algorithm
In this section we propose PriDE, a scalable low-communication algorithm which extends
the Loco framework (Heinze et al., 2016) for distributed estimation to the private setting.
Key to the PriDE algorithm is the data sharing mechanism. The schematic is given in
Figure 3. The full procedure is presented in Algorithm 1. We explain the following steps in
more detail:
In Step 2, we compute the random features (XkΠk) ∈ Rn×τsubs . Πk ∈ Rτ×τsubs is the
subsampled randomized Hadamard transform (SRHT) matrix which admits fast matrix-
vector products (Tropp, 2010). We then perturb this by a Gaussian random matrix Wk ∈
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Figure 3: Distributed differentially private data sharing mechanism used by PriDE.
Rn×τsubs ∼ N (0, σ2kI) to get Ẑk = XkΠk + Wk. The exact form of σk is given in Theorem
1.
In Step 4, the matrices of random features are communicated. For ease of notation, let
τK = (K − 1)τsubs. Party k then constructs the matrix
X¯k ∈ Rn×(τ+τK) =
[
Xk,
[
Ẑk
]
k′ 6=k
]
, (2)
which is the column-wise concatenation of party k’s raw features and the perturbed random
features from all other parties.
In Step 5 each party solves the following local dual optimization problem
α˜k = argmax
α∈Rn
−
n∑
i=1
f∗i (αi)−
1
2nλ
α>X¯kX¯>k α, (3)
where f∗ is the conjugate Fenchel dual of f . For example, for squared loss functions
fi(u) =
1
2(yi − u)2, we have f∗i (α) = 12α2 + αyi. This is solved using e.g. SDCA (Shalev-
Shwartz and Zhang, 2013).
The main difference to Dual-Loco is the perturbation of the random features in Step
2. Although a small algorithmic difference, this has important consequences for the analysis
which we present in the following section.
4. Analysis
For the discussion which follows we use the following definition of privacy which is con-
cerned with changes in the attribute values of the observations rather than the difference
in observations.
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Algorithm 1 PriDE
Input: Y , X vertically-partitioned over K parties, τsubs, λ, , δ
1: for each party k ∈ {1, . . .K} in parallel do
2: Compute perturbed random features
Ẑk = XkΠk + Wk.
3: Communicate Ẑk to all parties k
′ where k′ 6= k.
4: Construct local design matrix X¯k.
5: α˜k ← LocalDualSolver(X¯k, Y, λ)
6: β̂k = − 1nλX>k α˜k
7: end for
Output: Each party k obtains β̂k.
Definition 1 ((, δ,S)-differential privacy) A randomized algorithm Alg satisfies (, δ,S)-
differential privacy, if for all inputs X and X′ differing in at most one user’s one attribute
value of an attribute in S ⊆ {1, . . . , p}, and for all sets of possible outputs D ⊆ range(Alg)
P [Alg(X) ∈ D] ≤ e P [Alg(X′) ∈ D]+ δ (4)
where the probability is computed over the randomness of the algorithm.
When S = {1, . . . , p}, (, δ,S)-differential privacy reduces to (, δ)-differential privacy. In-
formally, this states that (up to the parameters of the differential privacy guarantee) an
adversary cannot infer a single attribute value for a single observation of an attribute in S
from the output of the algorithm despite knowing the values of all other attributes for all
other observations.
In the following definition, we use Definition 1 to formulate differential privacy in the
distributed setting. The definition is close to Definition 2.4 in Beimel et al. (2011); here,
we state it in our notation and for the case when δ > 0.
Definition 2 ((, δ)-distributed differential privacy) A randomized algorithm Alg sat-
isfies (, δ)-distributed differential privacy, if Alg satisfies (, δ,S)-differential privacy for
all S ∈ {P−k; k = 1, . . . ,K} where P−k is the set of indices corresponding to the features
non-local to party k.
A randomized algorithm Alg is (, 0)-distributed differentially private if Definition 2.4
in Beimel et al. (2011) is fulfilled for t = maxk |Pk|. The condition in Beimel et al. (2011) is
a bit stricter than ours as it requires (, δ,S)-differential privacy for all sets S with |Sc| ≤ t
and not just for P−k with k = 1, . . . ,K as we do here. We also want to allow for δ > 0 with
Definition 2.
PriDE achieves (, δ)-distributed differential privacy by perturbing random features
with Gaussian noise before communicating them. As detailed in §4.1, this procedure pre-
serves differential privacy according to Definition 1. While perturbing the random features
has an adverse effect on the accuracy of the coefficient estimates, we prove an upper bound
on the coefficient estimation error in §4.2. The error bound shows an interesting trade-off
between the desired level of privacy and the accuracy of the random feature representation.
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4.1 Distributed privacy guarantee
Theorem 1 (Adapted from Kenthapadi et al. (2013)) Let w2(Πk) denote the
`2-sensitivity of the projection matrix Πk and let the range of the columns of Xk be bounded
by θk. P−k is the set of indices corresponding to the features non-local to party k. Assuming
δ < 12 , let the entries of party k’s noise matrix Wk be drawn from N (0, σ2kI) with
σk >
w2(Πk) · θk

√
2(ln(1/2δ) + ).
Then PriDE satisfies (, δ)-distributed differential privacy.
The proof follows by adapting Kenthapadi et al. (2013) to hold for (, δ)-distributed dif-
ferential privacy. When Πk is the SRHT, w2(Πk) = 1. Theorem 1 guarantees that an
adversary who has access to the data held by party k and knows all values of all attributes
for every individual except for a single non-locally stored attribute value cannot infer that
value from the perturbed random features which have been communicated to party k. This
ensures PriDE fulfills Definition 2. In contrast to the Laplace mechanism, the use of the
Gaussian mechanism has the advantage that the required noise level is independent of the
dimension of the projection matrix.
4.2 Approximation error of PriDE
We now bound the coefficient approximation error between the PriDE solution and the
optimal solution to Eq. (1).
Assumption 1 Letting r denote the rank of X and τK = (K − 1)τsubs, we require the
following conditions to hold:
A1. The projection dimension is chosen such that τK & r log r.
A2. The problem is high-dimensional, i.e. n ≤ p, and r = n.
Theorem 2 (PriDE approximation guarantee) Assume all fi in Eq. (1) to be convex
and smooth with Lipschitz continuous gradients. Under Assumption 1 the overall error
between the optimal solution to Eq. (1) β∗ and the solution returned by PriDE β̂ is bounded
with probability at least 1−Kζ by
‖β̂ − β∗‖2 ≤
√
Kρ
(1− 2ρ)‖β
∗‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+
√
Kρ
(1− 2ρ)
σ
dmin
(
2 +
στK + στ
2
K
dmin
)
‖β∗‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
(5)
where ρ = C
√
r log(2r/ξ)
τK
, σ = maxk σk and dmin = dr(X), the smallest non-zero singular
value of X. C and ξ are absolute positive constants. The exact form of ζ is given in §A.
Proof strategy. (Full details are given in §A.) We require to bound the local coefficient
estimation error of a single party k which can then be combined with a union bound to
obtain the global approximation error. To bound the local error (Theorem 3), a key step is
bounding the difference between the full (non-perturbed, single-party) kernel matrix K and
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the projected-and-perturbed kernel matrix K˜ (omitting the subscript k for ease of notation)
where
K = XX> and K˜ = (XΘ + E)(XΘ + E)>,
Θ = diag(Iτ ,Π1, . . . ,ΠK−1) ∈ Rp×(τ+τK) and
E =
[
0τ W1 . . . WK−1
] ∈ Rn×(τ+τK).
When privacy is not required, σ = 0 and E = 0 in which case we recover the approxima-
tion guarantee of Dual-Loco which relies on the fact that ‖K− K˜‖2 ≤ ρ (Heinze et al.,
2016). However, this bound does not hold when i.i.d. Gaussian noise is added to those
entries of XΘ corresponding to the random features (i.e. σ > 0 and E 6= 0). Now, we
require to find an upper bound on ‖K− K˜‖2 and the proof also requires a lower bound on
‖K˜‖2. We can bound ‖K− (XΘ)(XΘ)>‖2 ≤ ρ and use Lemma 6 to bound the terms in-
volving E with high probability. While the exact expressions are more involved, intuitively,
in expectation the cross terms are zero while the diagonal elements of EE> are at most
σ2τK .
Finally, lower bounding K˜ requires a different technique as the involved cross terms are
not positive semidefinite. Using that terms involving E are centered around 0 and applying
a Chernoff bound (Lemma 7) allows us to show ‖K˜‖2 ≥ 1 − 2ρ. Full details are given in
§A. 
Discussion. The bound in Theorem 2 consists of two terms: (i) The approximation
error due to the (distributed) random projection representation. This decreases as the
projection dimension τsubs increases, providing a more accurate approximation to the non-
local features. (ii) The error due to the perturbation necessary for guaranteeing privacy.
This term is increasing in τsubs— a larger dimensional random feature representation con-
tributes more noisy dimensions which act like an additional `2-regularizer. This can be
seen clearly when comparing the solutions to the dual formulation of the ridge regression
objective: The optimal solution is given by α∗ = (K + λI)−1Y while party k computes
α˜ = ((XΘ + E)(XΘ + E)> + λI)−1Y . The diagonal elements of EE> are centered around
σ2τK = σ
2(K − 1)τsubs, so using a larger projection dimension τsubs increases the regulariz-
ing effect (and therefore bias) induced by EE> which acts in addition to the one caused by
λ.3 On the other hand, the bias can be decreased by increasing  (decreasing σ) implying
a weaker privacy guarantee.
We thus observe a trade-off between approximation quality and privacy. When a very
strong privacy guarantee is required—implying a large value of σ—a smaller τsubs should
be chosen so that the additional regularization does not become too strong. On the other
hand, if the privacy requirements are less stringent, a larger τsubs together with a larger 
will yield better approximation quality. In general, PriDE will be most effective when the
rank of the problem is such that a relatively small projection dimension will capture most of
the important structure in the data. We demonstrate the effect of this trade-off empirically
in the following section. Importantly, we shall see that the induced bias that results from
not communicating any data is often much larger than the bias of the PriDE estimates.
3. In §C we show that for the primal formulation of the least-squares objective, the effect of E can be
understood as an `2-regularizer which acts on the random features only.
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Table 1: Data set statistics. maxk (θk) is the largest bound on the range of the columns
of Xk among all parties, dmin is the smallest non-zero singular value of the design
matrix, reff(X) denotes the effective rank and Ju denotes the number of principal
components that capture u% of the variance in the data set.
ntrain p maxk (θk) dmin reff(X) J80 J90
Sim. 800 400 7.41 3.7e-6 2.03 3 5
Climate 849 10, 368 8.51 3.32 4.03 29 54
Cancer 188 2, 000 10.92 11.57 4.53 65 107
5. Experiments
We present results on three datasets summarized in Table 1. Also reported are the smallest
non-zero singular value of the design matrix, dmin; the effective rank reff(X) = tr
(
X>X
)
/‖X‖22
and the largest bound on the range of the columns of Xk among all parties, maxk (θk). The
effective rank (Vershynin, 2010) is a measure of the intrinsic dimension of a matrix which
captures whether the matrix lies near to a low-dimensional subspace.
We compare the performance of five methods:
• “Semi-Naive Bayes” (NB). Here, a separate model is learned by each party indepen-
dently:
β̂
NB
k = argminbk
∑n
i=1 fi(x
>
k bk) + λ‖bk‖22.
Since no data is communicated, the features are kept completely private.
• The standard Dual-Loco algorithm (corresponding to PriDE with σk = 0 ∀k).
Since the random features are not perturbed this does not guarantee privacy according
to Theorem 1.
• Our proposed PriDE algorithm. We show the effect of varying the privacy parameter
 by varying the noise variance σ2k. We fix δ = 0.05 as varying δ has only little effect
on σk. As σk also depends on the maximal range of the columns of Xk, we report the
maximum of σk for k = 1, . . . ,K in Table D.2.
• In the non-distributed setting: Glmnet (Friedman et al., 2010) and SDCA (Shalev-
Shwartz and Zhang, 2013).
For both Dual-Loco and PriDE we show results for different values of the projection
dimension τsubs. The absolute dimensions are given in Table D.1. Details on the cross
validation procedure are given in §E.
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Figure 4: Simulated data. Results for projection dimension τsubs = 0.2τ . Parameter estimation
errors are computed w.r.t. the data generating model. Additional plots for τsubs =
{0.05, 0.1} · τ can be found in Figure D.2 in the supplementary information.
5.1 Simulated data
We revisit example (A) given in §2. The data are simulated according to the model in
Figure 2.4 We consider two blocks of features, C and X. For example, C could contain
genomic data such as measurements of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). Due to
its highly personal and sensitive nature, genomic data arising from techniques like SNP
genotyping is rarely publicly available. The other block, X could hold gene expression
data. Some of the genomic features have an effect on some of the gene expression features
and both sets of features contribute to the response Y .
We distribute the two blocks of features over K = 2 parties so that X and C are
kept separately. In this experiment we aim to analyze the parameter estimation error with
respect to the true underlying coefficients β. Due to the dependence between C and X one
cannot obtain accurate coefficient estimates for the effect of X on Y when only including
X into the model. We aim to assess whether the perturbed random projections used by
PriDE suffice to communicate enough information to obtain accurate estimates in this
challenging estimation task.
Comparisons of normalized coefficient estimation error with respect to the data gen-
erating coefficients β are shown for τsubs = 0.2τ in Figure 4a-c. There is a significant
difference between the NB and Dual-Loco and SDCA solutions, particularly for block X.
This performance gap is to be expected due to the confounding effect of C. It shows that
in order to obtain accurate coefficient estimates in the distributed setting some degree of
communication is crucial which allows to adjust for the dependencies between the features.
For small  (more privacy) PriDE performs similarly to NB, i.e. the incurred biases are
on the same scale. As  increases, PriDE approaches and eventually equals the perfor-
mance of Dual-Loco and SDCA. This demonstrates that PriDE is able to approximate
the true β accurately for sufficiently large values of . Thus PriDE allows to adjust for the
confounding effects from C on X while guaranteeing (, δ,S)-differential privacy.
Figure 4d shows the normalized prediction MSE on the test set. All methods perform
similarly. Due to the confounding effect of C and X, NB is unable to obtain accurate
coefficient estimates but it can achieve good predictive performance in this example.
4. Full simulation details are given in §D.1 and the data generating code is provided as a supplement to
this work.
10
τ s
u
b
s
=
0.
0
5
τ
l
l
l l l l
l l
l
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00 2.00 5.00 10.00 20.00
PRIVACY PARAMETER ε
CO
RR
EL
AT
IO
N 
W
IT
H 
β*
l
l
l
l
DUAL−LOCO 5
GLMNET
NB
PriDE 5
l
l
l l l l
l
l l
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00 2.00 5.00 10.00 20.00
PRIVACY PARAMETER ε
PA
R
AM
ET
ER
 E
ST
IM
AT
IO
N 
M
SE
l
l
l
l
DUAL−LOCO 5
GLMNET
NB
PriDE 5
l
l
l l
l l
l l l
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00 2.00 5.00 10.00 20.00
PRIVACY PARAMETER ε
TR
AI
N
IN
G
 M
SP
E
l
l
l
l
l
DUAL−LOCO 5
GLMNET
NB
PriDE 5
SDCA
l
l
l l
l
l l l l
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00 2.00 5.00 10.00 20.00
PRIVACY PARAMETER ε
TE
ST
 M
SP
E
l
l
l
l
l
DUAL−LOCO 5
GLMNET
NB
PriDE 5
SDCA
(a) corr(β̂,β∗) (b) ‖β̂ − β∗‖22/‖β∗‖22 (c) Training MSPE (d) Test MSPE
Figure 5: Climate model data. Results for projection dimension τsubs = 0.05τ . The parameter
estimation metrics are computed w.r.t. the optimal single-machine solution β∗ obtained
with SDCA. Additional plots for τsubs = {0.01, 0.1, 0.2} · τ can be found in Figure D.3.
This experiment also suggests that Assumption 1 can be weakened to settings where the
effective rank of the data is low while n > p. Different proof techniques would be required
to extend Thereom 2 to such cases.
5.2 Climate model data
Next, we present an application to a problem in climate modeling. We consider data from
part of the CMIP5 climate modeling ensemble which are taken from control simulations of
the GISS global circulation model (Schmidt et al., 2014). We aim to forecast the monthly
global average temperature Y in February using the air pressure measured in January. The
features are pressure measurements taken at p = 10, 368 geographic grid points. The model
simulates the climate for a range of 531 years and we use the output from two control
simulation runs. The data set is split into training (ntrain = 849) and test set (ntest = 213),
and we distribute the problem across K = 4 parties.
Comparisons of correlation and estimation error, global training and test error (all
normalized) are shown for τsubs = 0.05τ in Figure 5. Since the true coefficients β are
unknown in this example, comparisons of correlation and estimation error are computed
with respect to the empirical risk minimizer, i.e. the optimal parameters β∗, estimated
using SDCA where all the data was available, non-perturbed, on a single machine. The
parameter estimation error is the quantity which is bounded in Theorem 2.
Importantly, there is a significant difference between the NB and Dual-Loco solutions.
This performance gap shows that in the distributed setting some degree of communication
is crucial for good statistical estimation and predictive accuracy for this problem as not
communicating any features incurs a large bias. In Figure D.3 we observe that increasing
τsubs does not cause a large change in the accuracy achieved by Dual-Loco. This suggests
that the problem is nominally low rank and a small projection dimension suffices to capture
the structure of the data. This is to be expected given the high degree of spatial correlation
of pressure measurements and is confirmed by the estimate of the effective rank and the PCA
statistics in Table 1. For reasonable values of , the PriDE solution quickly approaches
the Dual-Loco solution for all four measures of accuracy. Importantly, PriDE achieves
a test prediction error within the margin of error of the Dual-Loco prediction error.
We observe the trade-off implied by Theorem 2: As the projection dimension increases,
the Dual-Loco approximation error decreases (i.e. term (i) in Eq. (5)). However, term (ii)
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(a) corr(β̂,β∗) (b) ‖β̂ − β∗‖22/‖β∗‖22 (c) Training MSPE (d) Test MSPE
Figure 6: Gene expression data. Results for projection dimension τsubs = {0.05, 0.2}·τ . Further
results for τsubs = {0.01, 0.1} · τ can be found in Figure D.4.
grows with σ2(K − 1)τsubs. For very small values of  this second contribution dominates so
a smaller projection dimension typically yields better performance. As  increases, the gain
in approximation quality starts to outweigh the regularization bias incurred by increasing
τsubs, so that for large values of  a large projection dimension performs best. In Figure D.3,
this trade-off is reflected in a slower convergence to theDual-Loco solution for larger values
of τsubs.
5.3 Breast cancer gene expression data
Finally, we show an application to a problem in clinical bioinformatics. This experiment
aims to assess the performance of PriDE on a real data set from a domain where sensitive
data is ubiquitous. We use the breast cancer data set GSE34945 (Miller et al., 2005).
Our task is to predict the disease specific survival time of each patient in years where the
objective can be reformulated via an Accelerated Failure Time model as a least squares
objective; here with constant weights. The median follow-up of patients was 122 months.
Approximately 45, 000 gene expressions are available from n = 236 patients. We selected
genes with the largest absolute marginal correlation with the response, resulting in p =
2, 000 distributed across K = 4 parties. The data set is split into training (ntrain = 188)
and test set (ntest = 48). In this application, accurate estimates of β are of primary interest
to assess which genes are good predictors for survival time.
Figure 6a and b show comparisons of correlation and estimation error for τsubs =
{0.05, 0.2} · τ with respect to the SDCA solution β∗. Columns c and d show the nor-
malized training and test prediction MSE. We again observe a large difference between the
NB and Dual-Loco solutions which is essential for there to be some expected gain from
using PriDE. We observe similar trends as in the previous experiments: as  increases,
PriDE improves upon NB and approaches the Dual-Loco solution. The trade-off be-
5. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/geo/query/acc.cgi?acc=GSE3494.
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tween  and τsubs (implied by Theorem 2 and discussed above) is again apparent. The
convergence to the Dual-Loco solution with increasing values of  is somewhat slower
than in the previous experiment. This is partly due to the gene expression data having
heavier tails, resulting in a larger maxk (θk). This requires a larger noise level to guarantee
privacy leading to a more heavily regularized learning problem (cf. Tables 1 and D.2).
In summary, the behavior predicted by Theorem 2 is confirmed empirically. The best
performance of PriDE can be obtained by finding the optimum of the accuracy-privacy
trade-off, respecting the problem-specific constraints on privacy. That is, by choosing a
projection dimension τsubs that suffices to capture the signal contained in the non-local
features, so that term (i) in Eq. (5) is as small as possible without over-regularizing the
objective and introducing a large bias from term (ii). Finding the optimal projection dimen-
sion is then a problem of model selection. We discuss the challenges of a privacy preserving
cross validation scheme in §E.
In general, given a suitable projection dimension, PriDE can significantly improve upon
the NB solution: the bias of the NB estimates is often much larger than the bias of the
PriDE estimates. This suggests that the PriDE framework allows for accurate distributed
statistical estimation while guaranteeing (, δ,S)-differential privacy.
6. Related work
Privacy-aware learning. Ensuring differential privacy in supervised learning techniques
has garnered increasing interest in recent years (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2009; Chaud-
huri et al., 2011) and approaches have been proposed to solve more general convex optimiza-
tion problems in a private fashion (Song et al., 2013). These approaches achieve privacy
by either applying noise to the coefficient vector before it is returned or perturbing the
objective with noise during optimization.
Kenthapadi et al. (2013) apply a Johnson-Lindenstrauss random projection to compress
the column space of the design matrix and perturb the resulting matrix with Gaussian
noise. This procedure allows the compressed, perturbed data matrix to be published but
forfeits the interpretability of the features as any subsequent queries must be performed in
the compressed space. This approach is related to local privacy (Duchi et al., 2013) where
the algorithm only observes a disguised version of the data.
Distributed statistical estimation. Distributed estimation and optimization when the
data is horizontally partitioned has been a popular topic in recent years (Jaggi et al.,
2014; Zhang et al., 2013). However, the problem of statistical estimation when the data
is vertically partitioned has been less well studied since most loss functions of interest are
not separable across coordinates. A key challenge addressed by Heinze et al. (2014, 2016)
was to define a local minimization problem for each worker to solve independently while
still maintaining important dependencies between features held by different parties. This is
achieved by communicating low-dimensional random projections of the data held by each
party which keeps communication overhead low. Although this obfuscates the data to some
degree, it does not guarantee privacy.
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Preserving privacy in distributed learning. McGregor et al. (2011) introduce the
notion of two-party differential privacy which is generalized to an arbitrary number of
parties in Beimel et al. (2011). We discuss the relation to Definitions 1 and 2 in §4.1.
In distributed supervised learning, private approaches have been much less studied and
focus mainly on the setting where data is horizontally partitioned (Huang et al., 2015; Zhang
and Zhu, 2016). Few approaches have been considered for privacy preserving learning in
the distributed setting when the data is partitioned vertically (Yu et al., 2006; Mangasarian
et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2012; Mohammed et al., 2014). However, no formal guarantees with
respect to both privacy and utility are given.
7. Conclusions and further work
We have proposed PriDE which addresses some of the important concerns in learning from
sensitive, vertically partitioned data in a principled and scalable way. PriDE preserves
(, δ)-distributed differential privacy while maintaining a low approximation error with re-
spect to the optimal, non-private, non-distributed model. To the best of our knowledge,
no other methods with similar guarantees have been proposed for the considered problem
setting.
PriDE only communicates perturbed low-dimensional random projections of the orig-
inal features so the communication overhead is small. Since estimation is performed on
a combination of raw and random features, the solution is returned in the original space
preserving interpretability of the coefficients. This allows to assess a feature’s impact on the
response while accounting for the contribution of—possibly confounding—sensitive features
held by other parties. For prediction tasks, each party can use its own local design matrix,
consisting of raw and perturbed random features.
Empirically, we have shown on simulated and real-world datasets that the PriDE esti-
mates greatly improve upon the performance of the fully-private semi-Naive Bayes model
and approach (i) the true underlying coefficients, and (ii) the estimates of the non-private
and non-distributed Glmnet and SDCA solvers. PriDE also performs well in areas not
specifically covered by Theorem 2, as shown for the low-dimensional synthetic data. This
suggests that our result could be generalized to when the effective rank of the problem is
small.
Perturbing the random features is necessary to preserve privacy but adds bias to the
solution. An open question concerns whether recent approaches to errors-in-variables regres-
sion (Loh and Wainwright, 2012) could be used to obtain an unbiased solution and perhaps
improve the performance of local CV. For ensuring differentially private public coefficient
release, existing techniques such as perturbing the coefficients, objective (Chaudhuri and
Monteleoni, 2009; Chaudhuri et al., 2011), or dual variables (Zhang and Zhu, 2016) with
additive heavy-tailed noise may be used.
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Supplementary Information
Appendix A. Proofs
We first state and prove a theorem which bounds the estimation error for a single party,
k. The proof of Theorem 2 follows straightforwardly from combining this result for all K
parties and applying a union bound.
Theorem 3 Assume all fi in Eq. (1) to be convex and smooth with Lipschitz continuous
gradients. Under Assumption 1, the local difference between the optimal solution to Eq. (1)
at party k, β∗k, and the solution returned by PriDE at party k, β̂k, is bounded with proba-
bility 1− ζ by
‖β̂k − β∗k‖2 ≤
ρ
(1− 2ρ)
(
1 +
σ
dmin
(
2 +
στK + στ
2
K
dmin
))
‖β∗‖2 (6)
where ζ = 3c1 exp(−c2 log r) + 2ξ+ 2 per + e−(τ+τK)/16, τK = (K−1)τsubs, ρ = C
√
r log(2r/ξ)
τK
,
σ = maxk σk and dmin = dr(X), the smallest non-zero singular value of X. C, c1, c2, and ξ
are absolute positive constants.
Definition 3 For ease of exposition, we shall rewrite the dual problems so that we consider
minimizing convex objective functions. More formally, the original problem is then given by
α∗ = argmin
α∈Rn
{
D(α) :=
n∑
i=1
f∗i (αi) +
1
2nλ
α>Kα
}
. (7)
The problem party k solves is described by
α˜ = argmin
α∈Rn
{
D˜k(α) :=
n∑
i=1
f∗i (αi) +
1
2nλ
α>K˜kα
}
. (8)
Recall that K˜k = X¯kX¯
>
k , where X¯k is the concatenation of the τ raw features and (K −
1)τsubs perturbed random features for party k as in Step 4 of Algorithm 1.
Proof [Proof of Theorem 3] For ease of notation, we shall omit the subscript k in K˜k in
the following. Defining
Θ =

Iτ 0 . . . 0
0 Π1 0
...
... . . .
. . . 0
0 . . . . . . ΠK−1
 ∈ Rp×(τ+(K−1)τsubs) (9)
and
E =
[
0τ W1 . . . WK−1
] ∈ Rn×(τ+(K−1)τsubs), (10)
we can write the original as well as the projected and perturbed kernel matrices explicitly
as
K = XX> and K˜ = (XΘ + E)(XΘ + E)>
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respectively. Applying Lemma 4, on the l.h.s. of (18) we have
(α˜−α∗)>(K− K˜)α∗ = (α˜−α∗)>
(
XX> − (XΘ)(XΘ)> − (XΘE>)− (XΘE>)> −EE>
)
α∗.
Denoting UDV> = X, γ˜ = DU>α˜ and γ∗ = DU>α∗ we have
(α˜−α∗)>(K− K˜)α∗
= (γ˜ − γ∗)>
(
V>V −V>ΘΘ>V −V>ΘE>UD−1 −D−1U>EΘ>V −D−1U>EE>UD−1
)
γ∗.
By Assumption 1 r = n, so we have UU> = In. Adding and subtracting
(γ˜ − γ∗)>D−1U> (σ2(K − 1)τsubsI)UD−1γ∗ where σ2 = maxk(σ2k) yields
(α˜−α∗)>(K− K˜)α∗ = (γ˜ − γ∗)>
(
Ir −V>ΘΘ>V
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
γ∗
− (γ˜ − γ∗)>
(
V>ΘE>UD−1 + D−1U>EΘ>V
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
γ∗
+ (γ˜ − γ∗)>D−1U>
(
σ2(K − 1)τsubsI−EE>
)
UD−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(III)
γ∗
− (γ˜ − γ∗)>D−1U> (σ2(K − 1)τsubsI)UD−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(IV)
γ∗.
We now focus on bounding each of the terms (I), (II), (III) and (IV) in turn.
(I). This term is bounded with probability 1 − (ξ + p−τer ) by ρ1 = √ cr log(2r/ξ)(K−1)τsubs which
follows directly from applying Lemma 5.
(II). We aim to bound the term D−1U>EΘ>Vγ∗. Since the random terms are sub-
Gaussians, we will bound this term using Lemma 6 with Y = (U>E)> ∈ Rτ+(K−1)τsubs×r,
X = (Θ>V) ∈ Rτ+(K−1)τsubs×r and E [U>EΘ>V] = 0. Since the first τ rows of Y are
Y0 = 0, we decompose Y and the corresponding rows in X as
Y =
[
Y0 = 0
Y1
]
X =
[
X0
X1
]
.
According to this decomposition we can write Y >X = Y >0 X0+Y >1 X1. Clearly Y >0 X0 = 0 so
Y >X only has (K−1)τsubs non-zero summands. Now, applying Lemma 6, with probability
1− c1 exp(−c2 log r)
‖D−1U>EΘ>Vγ∗‖2 ≤ 1
dmin
‖U>EΘ>Vγ∗‖2
≤
√
r
dmin
‖U>EΘ>Vγ∗‖∞
≤ σc0
dmin
‖γ∗‖2
√
r log r
(K − 1)τsubs .
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(III). Since each entry of E is an independent Gaussian with variance bounded by σ2,
E
[
EE>
]
= σ2(K − 1)τsubsI. By Lemma 6 we have with probability 1− c1 exp(−c2 log r)
‖D−1U>
(
EE> − σ2(K − 1)τsubsI
)
UD−1γ∗‖2 ≤ σ
2c0
d2min
‖γ∗‖2
√
r log r(K − 1)τsubs
(IV).
‖D−1U> (σ2(K − 1)τsubsI)UD−1γ∗‖2 ≤ σ2(K − 1)τsubs
d2min
‖γ∗‖2 (11)
Combining (I) – (IV) and using c0
√
r log r
(K−1)τsubs ≤ c′ρ1 = ρ where ρ = C
√
r log(2r/ξ)
τK
and
τK = (K − 1)τsubs, we have with probability 1−
(
3c1 exp(−c2 log r) + ξ + p−τer
)
(α˜−α∗)>(K− K˜)α∗ ≤ ‖γ˜ − γ∗‖2‖γ∗‖2ρ
(
1 + 2
σ
dmin
+
σ2
d2min
(
τK + τ
2
K
))
(12)
On the r.h.s. of (18) we have with a = γ˜ − γ∗
(α˜−α∗)>K˜(α˜−α∗) = a>(V>Θ + D−1U>E)(V>Θ + D−1U>E)>a.
Denoting w = Θ>Va and m = E>UD−1a we have
(α˜−α∗)>K˜(α˜−α∗) = (w + m)>(w + m).
For convenience say τ˜ = τ+(K−1)τsubs = τ+τK . Importantly, m is symmetric around
0, so
(w + m)>(w + m) =
τ˜∑
i=1
(wi +mi)
2 ≥
τ˜∑
i=1
w2i · I{mi>0}. (13)
The r.h.s. of this expression corresponds to randomly subsampling summands from w>w =
a>V>ΘΘ>Va where the subsampling scheme is defined by the non-zero summands stem-
ming from the indicator function in Eq. (13). When only considering the non-zero sum-
mands, we can write the resulting matrix product as
(α˜−α∗)>K˜(α˜−α∗) = (w + m)>(w + m) ≥
τ˜∑
i=1
w2i · I{mi>0} = a>V>Θ˜Θ˜>Va
where Θ˜ contains the columns of Θ corresponding to the non-zero summands. In other
words, Θ˜ corresponds to a random projection matrix that projects to a lower-dimensional
space than Θ. Next, we can write
(α˜−α∗)>K˜(α˜−α∗) ≥ a>V>Θ˜Θ˜>Va = ‖a‖22 − a>
(
I−V>Θ˜Θ˜>V
)
a︸ ︷︷ ︸
(V)
. (14)
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To lower bound the r.h.s. of this expression, we need to upper bound (V). We achieve this
by first finding a lower bound on the number of non-zero summands in Eq. (13), i.e. on
the number of columns of Θ˜. Intuitively, the smaller the projection dimension realized by
Θ˜, the larger term (V) becomes. Using the Chernoff bound from Lemma 7 with δ = 1/2,
we can bound the probability that the number of non-zero summands lies below τ˜ /4 by
exp(−τ˜ /16). We can then upper bound (V) using Lemma 5 for Θ˜ ∈ Rp×τ˜ /4. So with
τ˜ = τ + τK and ρ˜ =
√
cr log(2r/ξ)
τ/4+(K−1)τsubs/4 , we have with probability 1− (ξ +
p
er + e
−(τ+τK)/16)
(α˜−α∗)>K˜(α˜−α∗) ≥ ‖a‖22 − a>
(
I−V>Θ˜Θ˜>V
)
a
≥ ‖a‖22 − ρ˜‖a‖22
≥ (1− ρ˜)‖a‖22
≥ (1− 2ρ)‖a‖22. (15)
Plugging 12 and 15 into Lemma 4 we have with probability at least
1− (3c1 exp(−c2 log r) + 2ξ + 2 per + e−(τ+τK)/16)
(1− 2ρ)‖γ˜ − γ∗‖22 ≤ ‖γ˜ − γ∗‖2‖γ∗‖2ρ
(
1 +
σ
dmin
(
2 +
στK + στ
2
K
dmin
))
. (16)
Finally, with the relationship β∗ = − 1nλVγ∗ and β˜ = − 1nλVγ˜ we have 1nλ‖γ∗‖2 =
‖β∗‖2 and ‖β˜ − β∗‖2 = 1nλ‖γ˜ − γ∗‖2 due to the orthonormality of V. Thus, we obtain the
following error bound for the coefficients estimated by party k
‖β̂k − β∗k‖2 ≤ ‖β˜ − β∗‖2 ≤
ρ
(1− 2ρ)
(
1 +
σ
dmin
(
2 +
στK + στ
2
K
dmin
))
‖β∗‖2 (17)
which holds with probability at least 1− (3c1 exp(−c2 log r) + 2ξ + 2 per + e−(τ+τK)/16).
Appendix B. Supporting results
Lemma 4 (Adapted from Lemma 1 (Zhang et al., 2014)) Let α∗ and α˜ be as de-
fined in Definition 3. We obtain
1
λ
(α˜−α∗)>
(
K− K˜k
)
α∗ ≥ 1
λ
(α˜−α∗)>K˜k(α˜−α∗). (18)
Proof See (Zhang et al., 2014).
Lemma 5 (Concatenating random features (Lemma 3 from Heinze et al. (2014)))
Consider the singular value decomposition X = UDV> where U ∈ Rn×r and V ∈ Rp×r
have orthonormal columns and D ∈ Rr×r is diagonal; r = rank(X). In addition to the raw
features, let X¯k ∈ Rn×(τ+(K−1)τsubs) contain random features which result from concatenat-
ing the K− 1 random projections from the other parties. Furthermore, assume without loss
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of generality that the problem is permuted so that the raw features of party k’s problem are
the first τ columns of X and X¯k. Finally, let
ΘC =

Iτ 0 . . . 0
0 Π1 0
...
... . . .
. . . 0
0 . . . . . . ΠK−1
 ∈ Rp×(τ+(K−1)τsubs)
such that X¯k = XΘC .
With probability at least 1− (ξ + p−τer )
‖V>ΘCΘ>CV −V>V‖2 ≤
√
c log(2r/ξ)r
(K − 1)τsubs .
Lemma 6 (Adapted from Lemma 14 from Loh and Wainwright (2012)) If X ∈ Rn×p1
and Y ∈ Rn×p2 are zero-mean sub-Gaussian matrices with parameters (Σx, σ2x) and (Σy, σ2y)
respectively. If n & log p then
P
(
‖
(
Y >X
n
− E
[
Y >X
])
‖∞ ≥ c0σxσy
√
log p
n
)
≤ c1 exp(−c2 log p).
Lemma 7 (Chernoff bound for sum of independent Bernoulli trials (Goemans, 2015))
Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi, where Xi = 1 with probability pi and Xi = 0 with probability 1− pi, and
all Xi are independent. Let µ = E(X) =
∑n
i=1 pi. Then
(i) Upper Tail:
P(X ≥ (1 + δ)µ) ≤ e− δ
2
2+δ
µ for all δ > 0;
(ii) Lower Tail:
P(X ≤ (1− δ)µ) ≤ e−µδ2/2 for all 0 < δ < 1.
Appendix C. Connection between (, δ,S)-differential privacy and
regularized least-squares estimation
In the PriDE framework, consider the unregularized local objective function for a single
party k when the functions fi are the squared error. From (9) and (10) we have (omitting
the subscript k for ease of notation)
‖Y − X¯b‖22 = ‖Y − (XΘ + E)b‖22.
Denoting X˜l, ∀ l 6= k as the concatenated random features we have
‖Y − (XΘ + E)b‖22 = ‖Y − (Xkbk +
∑
l 6=k
(X˜l + Wl)bl)‖22.
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Since all of the elements in W are sampled i.i.d. from an independent Gaussian with
variance σ2, let us now consider taking the expectation of this expression with respect to
the randomness in W:
EW‖Y − (Xkbk +
∑
l 6=k
(X˜l + Wl)bl)‖22.
Due to independence, we can simply consider the univariate expectation
Ew∼N (0,σ2) (y − (x˜l + w)bl)2 =
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσ2
exp
{
− w
2
2piσ2
}
· (y − (x˜l + w)bl)2 dw
= (y − x˜lbl)2 + σ2b2l .
So in τ + (K − 1)τsubs dimensions we obtain a regularized least squares objective where the
regularization is only on the (K − 1)τsubs random features
‖Y − (Xkbk +
∑
l 6=k
X˜lbl)‖22 + σ2
∑
l 6=k
b2l . (19)
The strength of the regularization is governed by the variance of the perturbation.
Appendix D. Additional experimental details and results
Data tables
Table D.1: Projection dimensions
K τ = p/K 0.01τ 0.05τ 0.1τ 0.2τ
Simulated 2 200 2 10 20 40
Climate 4 2, 592 26 130 259 518
Cancer 4 500 5 25 50 100
Table D.2: Largest noise standard deviation maxk (σk) when δ = 0.05
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 2 5 10 20
Simulated 162.47 66.99 35.10 24.42 19.05 10.87 5.67 3.68 2.48
Climate 186.59 76.93 40.30 28.04 21.88 12.48 6.51 4.22 2.84
Cancer 239.41 98.71 51.71 35.98 28.07 16.02 8.35 5.42 3.65
D.1 Simulation setting
We consider K = 2 blocks of features. One block of features could, for instance, contain
genomic data, such as measurements of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). We shall
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X
e.g.
Gene
expression
data
Y
e.g.
Health
status
C
e.g.
Genomic
data
Figure D.1: The confounders in C influence both
the variables in X as well as the re-
sponse Y .
denote the set of features contained in this block by C. Due to its highly personal and
sensitive nature, genomic data arising from techniques like SNP genotyping is hardly ever
publicly available. The other block of features could hold gene expression data. We denote
this second set of features by X. Some of the genomic features have an effect on some of
the gene expression features and both sets of features contribute to the response Y . This
results in the structure shown in Figure D.1. Due to the dependence between C and X one
cannot obtain accurate coefficient estimates for the effect of X on Y when only including X
into the model. In such settings, PriDE allows to adjust for the confounding effects from
C on X while guaranteeing (, δ,S)-differential privacy.
Specifically, each blocks of features contains τ = 200 features. So p = 400 and we choose
n = 1000 (ntrain = 800 resp. ntest = 200). In order to create an interesting correlation
structure both within the blocks of features and between C and X, we consider a Gaussian
random field on a 20×20 grid. So each grid point corresponds to one feature and we generate
n realizations from the model. We add confounding effects from C on X by selecting 20
pairs of features from X and C at random. Denote the set of tuples by M and a single
tuple by m = (ix, jc) where ix is the index of the chosen feature from X and jc is the index
of the chosen feature from C. For all tuples in M we set Xix ← Xix + Cjc . Subsequently,
we create the signal by aligning the coefficients β with the top 20 principal components of
the full design matrix. Finally, the response is generated as Y = Xβ + η. The elements of
η are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian noise with a standard deviation set to achieve a signal-to-
noise ratio SNR = ‖Xβ‖22/‖η‖22 of approximately 0.75. In this simulation, a noise standard
deviation of 500 yielded the desired SNR.
For all further details, we refer to the data generating code which is provided as a
supplement to this work in the script generate.R.
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(a) ‖β̂ − β‖22/‖β‖22
(b)
‖β̂X − βX‖22/‖βX‖22 (c) ‖β̂C − βC‖
2
2/‖βC‖22 (d) Test MSPE
Figure D.2: Simulated data. Results for different projection dimensions τsubs. Normalized pa-
rameter estimation MSE w.r.t. true β: (a) overall, (b) for block X and (c) for block
C. (d) Normalized prediction MSE on test set.
D.2 Additional results for simulated data
In contrast to the other two experiments, Figure D.2 shows that the performance of PriDE
is not as sensitive to the chosen projection dimension in case of the synthetic data set.
The approximation quality is fairly similar for τsubs = {0.05, 0.1, 0.2} · τ even though the
standard errors are larger for τsubs = 0.05τ . This can be explained by the small value of
dmin—here, dmin seems to be the quantity mostly determining the term (ii) in Eq. (5), so
that manipulating τsubs only has a very small effect on the overall bias.
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D.3 Additional results for climate model data
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(a) corr(β̂,β∗) (b) ‖β̂ − β∗‖22/‖β∗‖22 (c) Training MSPE (d) Test MSPE
Figure D.3: Climate model data. Results for different projection dimensions τsubs. In com-
parison to larger projection dimensions, a projection dimension of τsubs = 0.01τ is
not sufficient to capture the signal of the non-local features accurately. This is ap-
parent from the gap in performance between Dual-Loco and the Glmnet/SDCA
estimates which are obtained without any constraints on privacy or communication.
Secondly, when τsubs = 0.01τ , varying  only has a very small effect on the perfor-
mance of PriDE: due to the small projection dimension the additional regularization
introduced by the additive noise can be attenuated by choosing smaller values for λ
also when  is small. As τsubs increases, the performance of Dual-Loco and PriDE
improve as term (i) in Eq. (5) decreases. As predicted by Theorem 2, we also observe
the adverse effect on the approximation accuracy induced by term (ii) in Eq. (5) for
small values of  and large values of τsubs.
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D.4 Additional results for gene expression data
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Figure D.4: Gene expression data. Results for different projection dimensions τsubs. In com-
parison to larger projection dimensions, a projection dimension of τsubs = 0.01τ is
not sufficient to capture the signal of the non-local features accurately. This is ap-
parent from the gap in performance between Dual-Loco and the Glmnet/SDCA
estimates which are obtained without any constraints on privacy or communication.
Secondly, when τsubs = 0.01τ , varying  only has a very small effect on the perfor-
mance of PriDE: due to the small projection dimension the additional regularization
introduced by the additive noise can be attenuated by choosing smaller values for λ
also when  is small. As τsubs increases, the performance of Dual-Loco and PriDE
improve as term (i) in Eq. (5) decreases. As predicted by Theorem 2, we also observe
the adverse effect on the approximation accuracy induced by term (ii) in Eq. (5) for
small values of  and large values of τsubs.
Appendix E. Privacy preserving cross validation
When the regularization parameter λ is given, PriDE preserves (, δ,S)-differential privacy
(see Theorem 1). Finding a suitable λ via v-fold cross validation (CV) without compromising
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privacy is challenging. In general, useful privacy preserving model selection procedures are
an active area of research and few procedures have been proposed (Chaudhuri and Vinterbo,
2013). In Heinze et al. (2016), λ is tuned “globally”, i.e. the local predictions for a particular
λ are communicated, added and thus evaluated on the global objective. Alternatively, the
local objectives could be targeted—in this case only the perturbed random features are
communicated. Communicating predictions would compromise privacy so only local CV is
feasible in a setting where privacy is critical. The optimal λ is then chosen by each party
individually based on the CV performance on the local design matrix, using both the raw
and the perturbed random features.
A few results concerning the selection of λ in local and global CV are given in Table E.1
which compares the chosen value for λ using global and local cross validation on the climate
dataset. For larger values of , local CV selects similar values for λ as global CV. However,
for small values of  ( ≤ 0.5) the local cross validation scheme selects values for λ that are
much too large. Consequently, the predictive accuracy deteriorates, making the local CV
scheme infeasible for small values of . In §5, we tuned the regularization parameter using
5-fold global cross validation for all methods to assess the performance of PriDE without
confounding the comparison with this additional source of uncertainty.
One interesting aspect about the optimal value for λ chosen by global CV is the following
trend. The smaller , the smaller a value for λ tends to be selected. This is consistent with
the fact that the additive noise acts as an additional regularizer (see discussion in §4.2 and
§C). As this additional regularization increases with σ2, the chosen λ decreases, keeping
the total regularization constant. However, this balancing effect is only possible as long as
the additional regularization is not too large—at some point the chosen λ approaches zero
and cannot be decreased further.
Table E.1: Cross validation results. Comparison of the chosen value for λ in local cross
validation (LCV) and global cross validation (GCV) using the climate simulation
data with projection dimension τsubs = 0.05τ .
 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 2 5 10 20
GCV: λ 47 125 137 140 159 116 108 104
GCV: Test Mse 0.7551 0.7396 0.7396 0.7537 0.7460 0.7393 0.7358 0.7414
LCV: λ for k = 1 > 1, 000, 000 85, 000 117 85 99 153 147 84
LCV: λ for k = 2 > 1, 000, 000 90, 000 132 108 110 158 157 85
LCV: λ for k = 3 > 1, 000, 000 105, 000 133 141 197 164 160 104
LCV: λ for k = 4 > 1, 000, 000 110, 000 174 145 237 250 161 111
LCV: Test Mse 0.9960 0.9956 0.7576 0.7399 0.7351 0.7380 0.7332 0.7329
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